Lisa Pollack on J.P. Morgan’s $2B London Whale Loss: Too Big To Hedge
[Via Grasping Reality with Both Hands: Economist Brad DeLong's Fair, Balanced, and Reality-Based Semi-Daily Journal]
Lisa Pollack:
FT Alphaville » Too Big To Hedge: Throughout FT Alphaville’s coverage of the credit trades of JP Morgan’s Chief Investment Office, there were two thoughts that kept nagging us. We’d think about them whenever we wrote about the technicals the trades might be creating. One was: could this really happen under CEO Jamie Dimon’s watch? The other was: where the hell are the regulators in all of this?…
Like most trades, it probably started harmless enough, or it least it seemed that way. After all, no one enters into a trade to lose money….FT Alphaville thought they had entered into a curve trade…. The whole curve moving down would mean that these corporates are regarded as more creditworthy, i.e. spreads have tightened…. The curve flattens when things look bad even in the near term. Curves can completely invert when the view is that if the corporate (or sovereign) can manage to survive some immediate obstacles and not implode, things will probably get better or at least less bad…. [O]ur theory was that the CIO had put on a trade that bet that the CDX.NA.IG.9 — a credit index that was launched in 2007 which has decent liquidity due to the legacy of the CDO boom — would flatten. With such a trade, JP Morgan could say things like this (from the WSJ):
On a conference call with analysts, [J.P. Morgan Chief Financial Officer Doug] Braunstein said the positions are meant to hedge investments the bank makes in “very high grade” securities with excess deposits. (J.P. Morgan has some $1.1 trillion in worldwide deposits.) Braunstein said the CIO positions are meant to offset the risk of a “stress-loss” in that credit portfolio. He added the CIO position is made in line with the bank’s overall risk strategy. Which is a good thing to answer with when Paul Volcker comes knocking on your door, inquiring about any proprietary trading going on under your roof.
A flattener trade is just fine in reasonable doses, i.e. if there’s enough liquidity in the market to support it. Unfortunately, with curve trades, you have to rebalance them reasonably actively… keeping the ratio of protection bought at the short end to protection sold at the long end just right. Get this wrong and your position will start to look even more risky and volatile…. [I]t looks like the CIO… may have really screwed the pooch in terms of managing this trade, possibly increasing its overall size too in a fit of doubling down….
[More]
Reading this whole thing made my head hurt. All I get is that JPM lost $2 billion on something.
You know, banks that are too big to fail and expect to be bailed out by taxpayers should not do anything that cannot be explained to a college graduate. And they should have to reveal exactly what happened, not hedge around like JPM so that people speculate.
I like what Jonathan Weil wrote:
If a too-big-to-fail bank can’t disclose what its trading desk is doing for fear of blowing itself up, then the bank shouldn’t be allowed to do it.
And the only reason we are hearing about this now is that it could get worse. You knw, I’m not big on governments nationalizing private businesses but I am around to the idea we should just nationalize JMP and be done with it.
They take all the moral hazard out of their business – ‘we cannot ever fail so we can do just any stupid thing’ – because they know the taxpayers will back them up. Lose our shirts on stupid things, well, we will be made good.
This is easy to understand.




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